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1. Introduction. -Ever free relatives, as in (1a), can be contrasted with plain definites and plain 
free relatives (1b-c) on the one hand, and universal quantifiers (1d) on the other; it has been vari-
ously argued in the literature that they have universal quantificational force (Iatridou and 
Varlokosta 1998) and that they are definites with some added special property (Jacobson 1995, 
Dayal 1997, von Fintel 2000). 
 
(1) a. John read whatever Mary recommended. 
 b. John read what Mary recommended. 
 c. John read the book(s) Mary recommended. 
 d. John read everything Mary recommended. 
 
 In this paper, I propose a modified version of von Fintel (2000)’s analysis of –ever free 
relatives, which I argue can account for their peculiar pattern of behavior. 
1.1. IGNORANCE VS. INDIFFERENCE. Von Fintel (2000) distinguishes two types of –ever free rela-
tives: 
 
(2) a. Whatever it is that Arlo is cooking has a lot of garlic in it.   (ignorance) 
 ‘There’s a lot of garlic in the dish(es) that Arlo is cooking (and I don’t know what that is).’ 
 b. Ignorance presupposition: the identity of the referent varies across epistemic worlds. 
  ⟦whatever⟧ = λP.λw. ιx.P(w)(x) 
  Presupposition: ∃w′, w′′ ∈ F: ιx.P(w′)(x) ≠ ιx.P(w′′)(x) 
 
(3) a. Zack voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot.   (indifference) 
‘Zack voted for the person who was at the top of the ballot; and if a different person had 
been at the top of the ballot, Zack would have voted for that person.’ 
b. Counterfactual presupposition: the sentence is also true in worlds that are like the real 
world except for the identity of the free relative. 
 ⟦whatever⟧ = λP. λQ. λw. Q(w)(ιx.P(w)(x)) 
 Presupposition: ∀w′ ∈ minw [F ∩ λw′. ιx.P(w′)(x) ≠ ιx.P(w)(x))]: Q(w′)( ιx.P(w′)(x)) = 
  Q(w)( ιx.P(w)(x)) 
 
The meaning of indifference whatever thus has two parts: a relation between two proper-
ties that makes reference to a maximal individual, and a counterfactual component. 
2. –Ever free relatives and ACD. A well-known fact about Antecedent-Contained Deletion 
(ACD) constructions with quantifiers like every is that the size of the ellipsis determines the pos-
sible scope interpretations of the DP with respect to intensional operators: 
 
(4) a. John was willing to read every book that Mary did. 
 b. John was willing to read every book that Mary was. 
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If the smaller VP in (5a) is elided, the every-phrase can be interpreted either de dicto or de re; 
eliding the larger VP, as in (5b), forces the DP to move out of the scope of willing, in which case 
it can only have a de re reading. 
 Definites, including plain free relatives, show the same effect. But with whatever, the 
sentence with non-local ACD is still ambiguous: 
 
(5) John was willing to read whatever Mary was. 
 
It has not only a de re ignorance reading (John and Mary were willing to read the same books, 
and the speaker doesn’t know which ones), but also an indifference reading with what one might 
call a “de dicto flavor”1. On this interpretation, John was willing to read the books Mary was 
willing to read, but would have been willing to read other books if Mary’s preferences had been 
different. 
2.1. A “DE DICTO” READING FOR WHATEVER. Deriving a de dicto reading in the usual way is im-
possible, since the free relative has moved out of the scope of willing to undo antecedent 
containment. 
 
(6)  
 
 
The first argument of whatever is [λx. Mary was willing to read x]; the second is [λy. John was 
willing to read y]. Using von Fintel (2000)’s indifference meaning from (3b), we predict that the 
sentence is true if and only if John was willing to read what Mary was willing to read (from the 
assertion), and in minimally different worlds where Mary was willing to read something else, 
John was willing to read that. 
2.2. ANOTHER AMBIGUITY. Indifference free relatives do show scope interactions with quantifi-
ers, but not the ones we see with every: 
 
(7) Someone was willing to read whatever Mary was. 
 a. ‘Someone was willing to read what Mary was willing to read; and if Mary had been 
willing to read different things, someone would have been willing to read those.’ 
 b. ‘Someone was willing to read what Mary was willing to read; and if Mary had been 
willing to read different things, that person would have been willing to read those.’ 
 
These two readings can be derived from the two possible scope orders: the free relative above the 
indefinite, as in (8a), and the indefinite above the free relative, as in (8b). 
 
                                                 
1 Aside from the scope configuration, this reading differs from real de dicto readings in another way: it has a de re 
entailment (for the sentence to be true, John has to be willing to read the books Mary is willing to read in the actual 
world), and is thus not compatible with false-belief scenarios. 
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(8) a. 
   
 b. 
     
 
In (8a), the second argument of whatever is [λx. ∃y[y was willing to read x]], so the counterfac-
tual component states that in worlds where Mary was willing to read something else, there exists 
a person in that world willing to read it – not necessarily the same person. In (8b), on the other 
hand, the subject trace has not yet been bound by someone when whatever takes its second ar-
gument. This results in the other reading, where some particular person is indifferent. 
3. Other scope interactions. The example in (7-8) shows a difference between –ever free rela-
tives and universal quantifiers: the ambiguity in Someone was willing to read everything Mary 
recommended is an entirely different one. Every can scope over an indefinite and get a distribu-
tive reading, which can also be forced by modifying the indefinite with different. This is 
impossible for whatever (and other definites). 
 
(9) A different student will read every book.    (Beghelli 1997) 
 
(10) a. A (#different) student will read whatever Mary recommends. 
 b. A (#different) student will read the books. 
 c. A (#different) student will read what Mary recommends. 
 
Every can produce pair-list readings in wh-questions (Krifka 1992, Szabolcsi 1997); whatever 
and other definites cannot: 
 
(11) a. Which book did every student read?      (pair-list) 
 b. Which book did the students read?      (*pair-list) 
 c. Which book did whoever took the class read?    (*pair-list) 
4. Intolerance to exceptions. Despite the differences listed above, universal quantifiers and in-
difference free relatives do have one similarity: both require that all the individuals in the 
restrictor have the property in the nuclear scope. 
 
(12) a. Whoever was awake kept watch. 
 b. Everyone who was awake kept watch. 
 
Both are incompatible with a scenario where someone is awake but not keeping watch. 
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 Plural definites, on the other hand, are tolerant to exceptions (Schwarzschild 1996, Bris-
son 1998); this property is shared with plain free relatives (and ignorance free relatives). Adding 
all to a definite makes it intolerant to exceptions. 
 
(13) a. The villagers kept watch. 
 b. All the villagers kept watch. 
 
 The von Fintel (2000) semantics for indifference free relatives does not predict the im-
possibility of a “team-credit” reading like (13a) has; something more is needed to capture the 
fact that this reading is not available. 
4.1. WHAT ALL DOES. In the analysis of Brisson (1997, 1998), all blocks team credit, but is not a 
universal quantifier. Definites with all are also incompatible with pure totality predicates like be 
numerous and elect a president; this property is shared with indifference free relatives. 
 
(14) a. The first-year students are (*all) numerous. 
 b. *Whoever has a desk in the first-year office (is/are) numerous. 
 
All also resembles indifference free relatives with respect to the phenomena discussed previ-
ously: 
 
(15) a. #A different student read all the books. 
 b. Which book did all the students read?     (*pair-list) 
 
Brisson’s analysis of definites with and without all builds on Schwarzschild (1996)’s semantics 
for distributive and collective predication, whereby the context supplies a cover of the universe 
of discourse (which tells a distributive operator how far down to distribute). What all does, in 
this analysis, is to impose a “good fit” requirement on the cover, ruling out team-credit readings. 
 The similar behavior of indifference free relatives and definites with all suggest that this 
is the missing component that should be added to the meaning of indifference whatever to rule 
out team-credit readings. Thus, the initially somewhat puzzling behaviors of indifference free 
relatives result from the combination of two things: the good fit requirement that produces an 
intolerance to exceptions and an incompatibility with pure totality predicates, plus the counter-
factual modality that gives them their de dicto flavor in non-local ACD contexts. 
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